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WHAT JUSTICE REQUIRES: A CASE OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Mary Ross't
On September 22, 1982, a probationary fireman was found in
his van, shot to death.' On September 24, 1982, Sheila DeLuca, a
retired police officer, was arrested for his murder.2 In April 1984,
DeLuca was found guilty of murder in the second degree' and was
given a sentence of twenty years to life.4 Today, she is a free
woman.
The purpose of this note is to provide some hope for those
languishing in prisons, convicted of crimes they did not commit,
and for those who could have been convicted of a lesser crime had
an appropriate and viable affirmative defense been raised on their
behalf. This note also contains a warning for attorneys regarding
the scope of their responsibility to their clients. To accomplish this
purpose, the decisions of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals which dealt with Sheila DeLuca's case will be examined.
The effect of these decisions on later cases will also be explored.
The right to effective assistance of counsel,5 the right to testify,6
and the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance' will
be addressed in the context of these decisions.
I. UNDISPUTED FACTS
On the evening of September 21, 1982, Sheila DeLuca met
with friends and family at a bar in the Bronx to celebrate her birth-
day, her retirement from the police force, and her team's victory in
t Candidate forJ.D., 1998, City University of NewYork School of Law; M.S., 1976,
City University of New York, Brooklyn College; B.A., 1969, St. Joseph's College.
1 DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F. Supp. 1330, 1334 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 578 (2d
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 83 (1996).
2 Id. at 1335.
3 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(1) (McKinney 1987) ("A person is guilty of murder in
the second degree when: 1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he
causes the death of such person or of a third person ... .
4 DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at 1344.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955).
6 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (holding that based on the Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments, criminal defendants have a right to testify on their own
behalf).
7 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 1987).
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a women's softball league.8 She took her husband home early be-
cause he was sick, and upon his insistence she returned to the bar.9
Later, she and a friend went to an after-hours club, arriving at
approximately 5 a.m.1 ° They met Robert Bissett and his friends
Eugene Murphy and Robert Barrett, none of whom they knew.11
Around 7 a.m. they left the club together in Bissett's van.12 At
some point DeLuca and Bissett, being alone in his van, parked in a
deserted area along the service road of a highway.13 At about 2
p.m. on September 22, 1982, DeLuca left the van, called her hus-
band, and went home.14
That evening around 7 p.m., DeLuca's husband, a retired po-
lice captain, called the police and told them where they could find
Bissett's body.1 5 Mr. DeLuca called the police again, about an hour
later, and asked for the rape squad. 6 When a sergeant returned
the call, Sheila DeLuca described her abduction and rape. 17
DeLuca then hired John Patten, an attorney who had never
before tried a case involving homicide.18 After conferring with the
attorney and his partner, DeLuca gave the police the clothes that
she wore the previous evening. 9 She then went to a hospital for a
medical examination.2 0 Upon returning home, she gave the police
her service revolvers and her husband turned over the off-duty re-
volver which had been used to kill Bissett.21
II. THE TAL
At trial, the prosecution presented only circumstantial evi-
dence.2 2 They attempted to show DeLuca was a "loose" woman try-
ing to satisfy her sexual desires and then killing Bissett in cold
blood. 23 There were also apparent discrepancies in the evidence
given by prosecution witnesses which were never pursued by the
8 DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at 1333.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 1334.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1334 n.2.
19 Id. at 1334-35.
20 Id. at 1335.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1340.
23 Id.
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defense.2 4 Nor was the prosecution able to prove the victim's time
of death since the body had been refrigerated, thus altering the
progression of signs which could have indicated the approximate
time of death.25
The defense attempted to call only one witness, an expert on
rape trauma syndrome, to rebut the prosecution's theory that
DeLuca had lied about being raped. The trial judge refused to
allow the testimony.26 Not only was the defense unsuccessful at its
only attempt to call a witness, but they rested without presenting
any evidence.27
DeLuca was then convicted of second-degree murder.
28
Ill. SUBSEQUENT HISTORY
DeLuca's conviction was upheld without opinion on April 11,
1985 by the New York Appellate Division, First Department.29 Sub-
sequently, her leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals
was denied.3" The conviction became final on February 24, 1986,
when DeLuca's petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court was denied.31 Arguing that she received ineffective
assistance of counsel and admitting for the first time that she had
killed Bissett, DeLuca made a post conviction motion to vacate the
judgment.3 2 That motion was denied.33
After exhausting all state remedies, DeLuca petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.34 Her contention was that her trial
counsel was ineffective in two respects. 5 First, he failed to ade-
24 Id. at 1341 n.9, 10. Bissett's mother testified that Bissett and a woman had
stopped by the house that morning, and the owner of a paint store testified that Bis-
sett had visited. But neither of his friends who had been with him mentioned either
stop. Id. at n.9.
25 Id. at 1343.
26 Id. at 1344.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 People v. DeLuca, 488 N.Y.S.2d 529 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1985).
30 People v. DeLuca, 484 N.E.2d 677 (N.Y. 1985).
31 DeLuca v. New York, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986).
32 N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAw § 440.10(1) (h) (McKinney 1994) (stating that any time
after ajudgment has been rendered, the court upon which it was entered may vacate
the judgment, upon motion of the defendant, on the ground that it was obtained in
violation of the constitutional fights of defendant).
33 DeLuca, 484 N.E.2d 677.
34 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (a) (d) (West 1994) (providing that a writ of habeas corpus
may be granted by a judge of a circuit court or a district court).
35 DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F. Supp. 1330, 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 578 (2d
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 83 (1996).
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quately explore and use a possible defense based on extreme emo-
tional disturbance.3 6 Second, he also failed to advise DeLuca that
it was her decision whether or not to testify in her own behalf. 37
IV. TESTIMONY AT THE MAGISTRATE'S HEARING
District Court Judge Robert Ward referred the petition to
Magistrate Court Judge Roberts in January 1991.3 An evidentiary
hearing was held in July 1992.a9 In 294 pages of testimony, DeLuca
gave her version of the facts for the first time.40 Her attorney and
his partner, as well as three other witnesses who testified at the
hearing, confirmed that DeLuca's statements were consistent with
her account of the events prior to her trial in 1982. 4' Her version
of the events had also been recorded in the notes of a forensic
psychiatrist with whom her attorney had consulted prior to trial.4 2
At the magistrate's hearing, DeLuca testified that she had
been kidnapped by the three men.43 She stated that after driving
around the Bronx for a while and listening to the men talk about
their various sexual exploits, she thought that she was going to be
raped and killed.44 Two of the men then left on foot and DeLuca
and Bissett drove around in Bissett's van and eventually parked
under a highway.45 DeLuca testified that Bissett punched her sev-
eral times and forced her to perform oral sex and have vaginal
intercourse.46 DeLuca eventually grabbed a bottle and hit him in
the head.47 She then fled from the van and ran to a gas station,
called her husband, and asked him to pick her up. 48 She later real-
ized that she had given her husband the wrong address and, afraid
that Bissett might follow her, she walked back to her own car and
36 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 1987) (including an affirmative defense
of extreme emotional disturbance to the charge of murder in the second degree).
37 DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at 1344.
38 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b) (1) (granting a judge power to designate a magistrate
judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing and submit proposed findings of fact and a
recommendation for disposition).
39 DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at 1344.
40 See Transcript of Magistrate's Hearing, DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F. Supp. 1330
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (No. 90 Civ. 4026).
41 DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at 1335 n.4.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1336.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1337.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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drove home.4 9 She testified that at that time she did not have her
gun with her.5"
After arriving home, DeLuca broke down and told her hus-
band what had happened. 51 Her husband wanted her to report
the incident but DeLuca was embarrassed and in pain and wanted
to go to a hospital.5 2 Mr. DeLuca insisted that the incident be re-
ported, and he offered to make the report himself.53 DeLuca
could not remember the names of the streets where the van had
been parked, but offered to show her husband on the way to the
hospital.54 Before leaving for the hospital, DeLuca got her gun be-
cause she felt vulnerable.55
When they arrived at the rape site, the van was still parked
where DeLuca had left it.56 DeLuca drew her gun.57 She and her
husband approached the van, one on either side. 5' They opened
the front doors simultaneously and saw no one.59 Suddenly Bissett
lunged from inside the van and knocked Mr. DeLuca down.6"
Sheila DeLuca told Bissett not to move. 61 Bissett grabbed her arm,
saying he was going to kill her.62 DeLuca shot him.6" DeLuca and
her husband then immediately drove home, and Mr. DeLuca
called the police.64
V. HOLDING AND RATIONALE
Magistrate Judge Roberts issued her report in December 1993
recommending that the petition for habeas corpus be denied upon
a finding that DeLuca's counsel had not been ineffective and that
the refusal of the trial court to allow evidence of rape trauma syn-
drome did not deprive DeLuca of her constitutional rights.6 5 Peti-
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1338.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1344.
1998]
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tioner filed an objection to the report66 and Judge Ward reviewed
the recommendations of the magistrate.67 After a review of the rec-
ord de novo, the court rejected the magistrate's recommenda-
tions.61 Judge Ward found that DeLuca's counsel had been
ineffective on both the ground of failure to prepare and preserve
the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and on
the ground of failure to inform DeLuca that it was ultimately her
decision whether or not to testify.69 After serving ten years in
prison, DeLuca's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was granted. w
The State of New York appealed the decision of the district
court." On February 13, 1996, in a two to one decision, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the district court's find-
ing that failure to prepare and preserve the defense of extreme
emotional disturbance had prejudiced DeLuca's case and that de-
fense counsel was ineffective. 72 The Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit did not address the issue of defendant's right to
testify.73 Eight months later, the Supreme Court denied the state's
appeal for certiorari. 4
VI. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel.75 This guarantee is found in the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution7 6 and in the New
York State Constitution.77 Respect given to the principle of the
66 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1) (West 1993); FED. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (providing that
within ten days after receiving a copy of a report, a party may file written objections to
the findings).
67 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b) (1) (West 1993) (stating that the judge may accept or reject
the recommendations of the magistrate); FED. R. Crv. P. 72 (a); DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at
1345.
68 DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at 1347.
69 Id. at 1363-64.
70 Id. at 1364.
71 DeLuca v. Lord, 77 F.3d 578 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 83 (1996).
72 Id. at 579.
73 Id. at 590. See DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at 1353-59 (discussing defendant's right to
testify).
74 DeLuca v. Lord, 117 S. Ct. 83 (1996).
75 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
76 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing in part that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial and have the assistance of
counsel for his defense). See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (holding that
the right to effective assistance of counsel is required by due process).
77 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (providing in part that in any trial the party accused shall
be allowed to defend in person and with counsel and be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation and be confronted with witnesses against him).
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right to effective assistance of counsel reflects a commitment to
provide defendants with the opportunity to be participants in the
adversarial process."8
In Strickland v. Washington,79 the United States Supreme Court
addressed for the first time the standards by which to judge a claim
of ineffective counsel.80 Justice O'Connor stressed that the pur-
pose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment
was not to improve the quality of representation, but rather to en-
sure a fair trial for criminal defendants.8 " The counsel's role was
viewed by Justice O'Connor as critical to the production of just re-
sults in the adversarial system.8 2 Therefore, in determining a claim
of ineffective counsel, the court must decide whether counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the system as to
make the justice of the trial's outcome questionable.8 3
A convicted defendant's claim of ineffective counsel is subject
to a two part test.8 4 She "must show that counsel's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"8 5 and "that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofes-
sional errors, the result of the trial would have been different."86
In assessing counsel's conduct, a court must presume that the chal-
lenged conduct fell within a "wide range of professional assist-
ance."8 7 In making a fair assessment of counsel's conduct, the
court must try to view that performance from the perspective of the
attorney at the time of the trial and eliminate the effects of
hindsight.8 8
VII. OBJECTIVELY UNREASONABLE PERFORMANCE
The Court in Strickland gave only basic guidance to lower
courts on how to determine what standard of reasonableness estab-
78 William J. Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Stan-
dards and Competent Representation, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 181, 201 (1984).
79 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
80 Id. at 684.
81 Id. at 685 (the Court defined a fair trial as "one in which evidence subject to
adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues de-
fined in advance of the proceeding.").
82 Id.
83 Id. at 686.
84 DeLuca v. Lord, 77 F.3d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 83 (1996)
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
85 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
86 Id. at 694.
87 Id. at 689.
88 Id.
19981
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lishes ineffective counsel.89 The dissent in Strickland points out that
"the majority has instructed judges called upon to assess claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel to advert to their own intuitions
regarding what constitutes 'professional' representation, and has
discouraged them from trying to develop more detailed standards
governing the performance of defense counsel."' The develop-
ment of the requirements for reasonable competency came about,
for the most part, on a case-by-case basis as courts evaluated what
lawyers were or were not doing in individual cases.91 In regard to
counsel's duty to investigate and make strategic choices-an issue
in DeLuca 2-the Court held that thoroughly investigated choices
were not challengeable, while the decision not to investigate or the
choices made without thorough investigation were to be evaluated
for reasonableness in light of all the circumstances.93
In determining the reasonableness of such choices, a heavy
measure of respect should be accorded to the decisions of coun-
sel.9 4 The Court did suggest that the standards of the American
Bar Association (ABA) would be helpful in determining what is
reasonable, but cautioned that the standards were only guides.95
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice call for a defense attorney
to investigate and explore all avenues leading to facts that are rele-
vant to a case and the sentence in the event that the defendant is
found guilty. 96 In the commentary, it is noted that an attorney has
an important function in raising such mitigating factors as a de-
fendant's background, employment record, emotional stability,
and circumstances surrounding the crime.9 7 The commentary also
cautions attorneys that inadequate preparation or lack of pretrial
investigation could lead to a finding of ineffective assistance.9"
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that
"not all strategic choices are sacrosanct. Merely labeling [coun-
sel's] errors 'strategy' does not shield his trial performance from
89 Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Stan-
dard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 323, 335 (1993).
90 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 708 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91 Genego, supra note 78, at 190.
92 DeLuca v. Lord, 77 F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 83
(1996).
93 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.
94 Id. at 691.
95 Id. at 688.
96 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEFENSE FUNC-
TION § 4-4.1(a) (1993).
97 Id. at § 4-4.1 commentary at 183.
98 Id.
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Sixth Amendment scrutiny."9 9 In Maddox v. Lord,1"' the court held
that after counsel raised a defense of extreme emotional distur-
bance, his failure to investigate it and pursue it was unreasona-
ble. 10 1 But, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Flores102 held
that "a simple disagreement with strategies, tactics[,] or the scope
of possible cross-examination, weighed long after the trial, does
not suffice" to conclude that counsel was ineffective. 103
However, the dissent in Flores argued that the toleration of
professional errors in trial strategy must have some limitations,
measured in part by the assumption "that a criminal defense attor-
ney will do whatever is necessary and appropriate .. .to help the
client avoid an unfavorable judgment] ... 104
In DeLuca, the district court judge clearly set out the Strickland
standard.10 5 The court recognized that Strickland did not establish
mechanical rules, but "instructs examining courts to judge each
claim individually by looking to the legal profession's 'prevailing
norms of practice' in order to determine whether, under the par-
ticular circumstances present, the attorney's actions constitute rea-
sonable assistance. "106
DeLuca's trial attorney, Patten, believed in her innocence
from the very beginning and zealously attempted to secure her ac-
quittal. 107 However, that zeal led to the decision to pursue an ob-
jectively unreasonable strategy.'0 8 According to Patten's testimony
at the evidentiary hearing, he believed that there were only two
possible defense strategies. The first strategy was to claim the justi-
fication defense that DeLuca's actions were in self defense.' 09 Pat-
ten did not pursue this strategy. The second strategy, the one he
did pursue, was to argue that the state could not prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt.1 10 Patten was certain that the prosecu-
99 Quartararo v. Fogg, 679 F. Supp. 212, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 849 F.2d 1467
(2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
100 818 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1987).
101 Id. at 1061-62.
102 639 N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1994).
103 Id. at 20 (citation omitted).
104 Id. at 23 (Titone, J., dissenting). See THE LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILrIy Canon 7 (N.Y. State Bar Ass'n 1994).
105 DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F. Supp. 1330, 1346-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 578
(2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 83 (1996).
106 Id. at 1345.
107 Id. at 1346.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
19981
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tion was wrong about the time of the shooting.11' Patten thought
that a jury could believe that Peter DeLuca, having access to the
murder weapon and having a possible motive, had committed the
murder.1 1 2 However, at the trial, the defense never attempted to
present any evidence that Mr. DeLuca might be implicated or as to
the correct time of the shooting.11 Patten attempted to call only
one witness, a rape trauma expert.114 Because the defense did not
present any evidence that DeLuca had been raped, the trial court
did not allow the witness.1 15
Testimony at the magistrate's hearing provided insight into
some of the evidence that was available to DeLuca's attorney dur-
ing the eighteen months before the trial began. For example,
DeLuca had spoken to a bartender from another establishment
who had observed Bissett and his friends snorting cocaine and had
asked them to leave the bar that night. 16 DeLuca had a written
statement from another woman who had been previously abducted
and assaulted by Bissett1 17 She also had found a police report al-
leging that Bissett had killed someone. 118 Furthermore, Ellen
Yaroshefsky, a lawyer who worked for the Center for Constitutional
Rights, met with DeLuca and Patten and explained why she
thought DeLuca had a justification of self defense.' 19 DeLuca's
marriage was purely platonic. 12 ° DeLuca was a lesbian. 121  There
were pictures taken of her bruised body with her family physician
present. 122 In addition, there were other witnesses to support a de-
fense of extreme emotional disturbance who were available to tes-
tify, including a friend who was with Sheila DeLuca the night of the
party and the physician who examined her on the night of Bissett's
death. 123
111 Id. at 1344.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Transcript of Magistrate's Hearing at 70-71, DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F. Supp. 1330
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (No. 90 Civ. 4026).
117 Id. at 64. The woman would also have been available to testify at trial. Id. at 65.
118 Id. at 68.
119 Id. at 309-17.
120 Id. at 28-30.
121 Id. at 28.
122 Id. at 55-56.
123 DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at 1338-39. In fact, the trial had been adjourned several
times because Mr. DeLuca had developed cancer and his ability to testify was ques-
tionable. He eventually had the nerve endings in his back cut so that he would be
able to testify. Id. Evidence of prior conduct by the victim could also have been
presented. Id.
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VIII. THE DEFENSE OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE
It is no longer true in modern criminology that "'[a] homi-
cide is a homicide is a homicide.' ' 124 The current trend is to
lessen criminal accountability when mitigating circumstances are
proven which render the defendant less liable.
1 2 5
[I]t is an affirmative defense that . . . [t]he defendant acted
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for
which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reason-
ableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as
the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this
paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or pre-
clude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any
other crime .... 126
The purpose of this affirmative defense is to allow a defendant to
show that a mental infirmity of a lesser degree than insanity caused
her actions and, therefore, rendered her less culpable. 127 If the
defense is successful, the defendant is found guilty of manslaughter
in the first degree rather than murder in the second degree. 12' A
conviction of a lesser charge could significantly reduce the
sentence.12
9
In deciding whether to submit this defense to the jury, the
court must decide if there is enough credible evidence so that a
jury may determine whether the elements of the defense are
met.' ° In determining the reasonableness of a defendant's reac-
124 People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 910 (N.Y. 1976) (Breitel, C.J., concurring),
affd sub nom. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
125 Id. at 908.
126 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 1987).
127 Patterson, 347 N.E.2d at 907. See People v. Owens, 611 N.Y.S.2d 67, 68 (App. Div.
4th Dep't 1994) (mem.) (explaining why evidence showing that defendant suffered
from multiple personality disorder entitled her to extreme emotional disturbance de-
fense and reduced her conviction from second degree murder to first degree
manslaughter).
128 A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when ... [w]ith
intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such
person . . . under circumstances which do not constitute murder be-
cause he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance
.... The fact that a homicide was committed under the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance
reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree ....
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.20(2). See also N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(1)(a) ("Nothing con-
tained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a
conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree. ).
129 Patterson, 347 N.E.2d at 907.
130 People v. Moye, 489 N.E.2d 736, 739 (N.Y. 1985) (mem.).
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tion, the appropriate test is whether, by examining the totality of
the circumstances, the fact finder can understand how a person
could lose control of her reason. 31 This test requires proof of a
subjective element, that the defendant acted under the influence
of extreme emotional disturbance, and an objective element, that
there was a reasonable excuse for the disturbance.132 Whether an
excuse is reasonable is determined "by viewing the subjective, inter-
nal situation in which the defendant found [herself] and the exter-
nal circumstances as [she] perceived them .... .. 3 The defendant
must be able to prove both elements of the affirmative defense by a
preponderance of evidence.'3 4
While psychiatric testimony may provide objective reasons for
a person's conduct,13 it is not legally necessary in order to raise
the defense. 1 6 Where conflicting expert testimony is presented, a
jury may accept whatever opinion it finds more credible. 137 Con-
duct influenced by extreme emotional disturbance need not be im-
mediate, but may be caused by a trauma which had affected the
person's mind for some period of time and then came forward. 138
However, a defendant needs to provide proof that a provoking act
affected her at the time of the murder, so that a jury could con-
clude that she acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance. 13
9
DeLuca testified at the evidentiary hearing that her attorney,
Patten, had discussed an insanity defense with her but not the de-
131 People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1313 (N.Y. 1980).
132 Id. at 1316.
'33 Id.
134 See Moye, 489 N.E.2d at 738; Patterson, 347 N.E.2d at 901; People v. Drake, 629
N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1995) (mem.) (holding that jury was entitled
to find that defendant did not meet the burden of proof required to establish de-
fense); People v. Walker, 473 N.Y.S.2d 460, 461 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1984) (holding
that defendant provided no specific evidence to establish the defense); N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 25.00 (McKinney 1987).
135 People v. Feris, 535 N.Y.S.2d 17, 18 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1988) (holding that
defendant's claim of extreme emotional disturbance was not substantiated by expert
testimony).
136 See Moye, 489 N.E.2d at 738; People v. Harris, 491 N.Y.S.2d 678, 688 (App. Div.
2d Dep't 1985).
137 See People v. Ayala, 633 N.Y.S.2d 548, 549 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995); People v.
Tolbert, 625 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995); People v. Owens, 611 N.Y.S.2d
67, 68 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1994) (Balio, J. and Callahan, J., dissenting in part).
138 Patterson, 347 N.E.2d at 908.
139 People v. White, 590 N.E.2d 236, 238 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that victim's re-
peated humiliation of defendant was sufficient to establish provocation, but the prov-
ocation was so remote that, alone, it was not enough to prove that defendant was
extremely emotionally disturbed at the time of the murder).
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fense of extreme emotional disturbance. In explaining the insanity
defense, he told her about a police officer who had pled temporary
insanity to the shooting of a child and spent less than a year in a
mental institution for the crime. Patten testified that he
dropped the defense at an early stage because of his client's aver-
sion to seeing a psychiatrist."' However, DeLuca testified that she
had agreed to see a psychiatrist, but Patten had canceled the ap-
pointment. 142 Although the magistrate judge gave credence to Pat-
ten's testimony, the district court found DeLuca's account
supported by other witnesses who had been involved in these dis-
cussions.14 Her attorney consulted with a psychiatrist whose notes
of the meeting included two possible defenses, but nothing about
extreme emotional disturbance.' 44 Patten's law partner could not
remember any discussions about an extreme emotional distur-
bance defense.145 The court was not persuaded that Patten under-
stood the defense of extreme emotional disturbance.146 All of this
may help to explain why DeLuca was not informed of the defense
of extreme emotional disturbance.
147
The court found that the defense attorney's failure to ade-
quately consider the extreme emotional disturbance defense re-
sulted in a breakdown of the process which should "'produce just
results.' "148 Judge Ward reasoned that counsel's disclaimer that he
did not know whether the defendant understood the defense was
evidence of an insufficient attempt to "'consult with his client on
[an] important decision.' ,,149 In light of these circumstances, espe-
cially considering that counsel consulted with and attempted to
call a rape trauma expert, it was unreasonable to have abandoned
the one defense about which the expert could testify.15°
140 Transcript of Magistrate's Hearing at 73, DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F. Supp. 1330
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (No. 90 Civ. 4026).
141 DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F. Supp. 1330, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 77 F. 3d 578 (2d
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 83 (1996).
142 Transcript of Magistrate's Hearing at 73-74.
143 DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at 1348.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1347.
147 Id.
148 Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984)).
149 Id. at 1350 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
150 People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 136 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that the patterns of
responses of rape victims are not within the understanding of a lay juror).
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IX. PREJUDICE
There is a consensus among the courts that unless counsel's
performance prejudices the defense, the criminal defendant's
claim of ineffective counsel will not stand. 5' A court is not re-
quired to determine the reasonableness of defense counsel's per-
formance unless it first determines that the performance
prejudiced the defendant. 52 Prejudice could be found if there was
a reasonable probability that counsel's performance undermined
confidence in the outcome of the trial.. 5 To meet the second
prong of this test, the defendant must be able to demonstrate that
the fact finder would have reasonable doubt concerning the de-
fendant's guilt, absent counsel's error.154 It is not enough to show
that counsel's unreasonable performance had some possible effect
on the outcome of the trial. 155 The burden on the defendant to
prove prejudice helps to ensure that the court's standard will rarely
result in a reversal. 156
The district court found that this standard was easily met by
DeLuca and concluded that the result of the trial would have been
different had an extreme emotional disturbance defense been
presented. 157 Judge Ward reasoned from DeLuca's testimony at
the evidentiary hearing that she "would have been a very compel-
ling witness.' 58 DeLuca could have told the jury that she had been
a police officer for fifteen years, a school teacher, a nun, and a
151 Maddox v. Lord, 818 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir. 1987); Quartararo v. Fogg, 679 F.
Supp. 212, 239 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 849 F.2d 1467 (2d Cir. 1988). See Winkler v.
Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 310 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that counsel's conflict of interest did
not prejudice defense's case); see also Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 685-87 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that defendant suffered prejudice, by presumption, when counsel was
asleep for substantial periods of time during the trial); United States v. Malpiedi, 62
F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that prejudice is presumed where defense
counsel has conflict of interest).
152 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
153 Id. at 694.
154 Id. at 695; Maddox, 818 F.2d at 1062. But see Henry v. Scully, 918 F. Supp. 693,
717-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 78 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that even where
evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty, the court could not be sure
that admission of improper hearsay and absence of missing witness charge could have
influenced jury to come to a different verdict); People v. Smith, 643 N.Y.S.2d 315, 322
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1996) (holding that even though attorney's unreasonable rep-
resentation might not have prejudiced outcome of trial, defendant was still deprived
of a fair trial).
155 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
156 Genego, supra note 78, at 199.
157 DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F. Supp. 1330, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 578 (2d
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 83 (1996).
158 Id. at 1350.
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basketball coach.' 59 The judge felt that her most convincing argu-
ment might have been that she was a homosexual and her relation-
ship with her husband was platonic.16 ° Although defense counsel
knew of DeLuca's background and employment record, he failed
to raise any of these mitigating factors.' 6 ' There were also many
people who would have been available to testify as to her reputa-
tion for truthfulness.1 62 Additionally, her version of the events was
supported by physical evidence, medical reports, and other wit-
nesses. 16 3 In summary:
DeLuca's account of her abduction and rape would clearly allow
the jury to find that she had "been exposed to an extremely un-
usual and overwhelming stress" and had "an extreme emotional
reaction to it, as a result of which, [she suffered] a loss of self-
control and [her] reason [was] overborne by intense feelings,
such as passion, anger, distress[] . . . or other similar
emotions."'
164
In reviewing the decision of the district court, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that DeLuca's counsel's fail-
ure to present any defense left the jury with two choices: acquittal
or guilty of second degree murder. 165 However, by testifying,
DeLuca would have had to admit that she killed Bissett, which had
the disadvantage of leaving the jury with no reasonable doubt and
precluding a chance of acquittal.1 66 But, proof of the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance could have reduced the conviction
from murder in the second degree to manslaughter in the first de-
gree. 167 The court found that there was a reasonable probability
that some of the jurors would have accepted DeLuca's testimony
that she had been raped and had acted under the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance.16 Patten's abandonment of the
extreme emotional disturbance defense without justification was
not within the bounds of "reasonable professional judgment or a
reasoned strategic choice."' 6 9 In affirming the district court's deci-
159 Id.
160 Id. at 1352.
161 Id. at 1350-51.
162 Id. These included police officers, former teachers, and members of the reli-
gious community of which she had once been a member. Id.
163 Id. at 1351-52.
164 Id. at 1352 (quoting People v. Shelton, 385 N.Y.S.2d 708, 717 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1976)).
165 DeLuca v. Lord, 77 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 83 (1996).
166 Id.
167 Id.; N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 125.25(1)(a), 125.20(2) (McKinney 1987).
168 DeLuca, 77 F.3d at 590.
169 Id. at 588 (footnote omitted).
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sion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that "the Strick-
land test of 'reasonable probability' of a different outcome was
easily met."' 7 ° Given the mitigating circumstances surrounding
DeLuca's case, her desire to testify, other evidence, and witnesses
available at the time of the trial, it seems likely that jurors would
have accepted the defense of extreme emotional disturbance and
convicted her of manslaughter. 7 '
The dissent of Judge Kearse in the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals' opinion found that defense counsel's performance did
not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. 172 Judge
Kearse argued that faulting counsel for failure to present an ex-
treme emotional disturbance defense, which had been prepared,
constituted pure hindsight on the part of the majority.' 73
In the dissent's opinion, counsel's abandonment of the ex-
treme emotional disturbance defense on the belief that psychiatric
testimony was required in order to succeed was not defective.'7
The argument was based on People v. Harris.1 75 That court, how-
ever, conceded that psychiatric testimony was not legally re-
quired. 176 Additionally, in that case the court found the allegations
of faulty advice were unsupported by any evidence or affidavits,
were contradicted by a lawyer actually present at the original dis-
cussions, and in view of other circumstances of the case, could not
reasonably be true. 77 In DeLuca, the evidence, lack of contradic-
tion, and testimony of experts pointed toward an extreme emo-
tional disturbance defense and makes it clearly distinguishable
from Harris.
While finding the majority's view shortsighted, the dissent
never addressed the majority's view that DeLuca's attorney did not
170 Id. at 590 (citation omitted). See also Maddox v. Lord, 818 F.2d 1058, 1061-62
(2d Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant, who shot her husband because she was afraid
of him, was found to have received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attor-
ney raised the defense of extreme emotional disturbance but did not investigate it or
pursue it thoroughly. The court found this failure to be unsound trial strategy.).
171 Ineffective Counsel; Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 20 Mental & Physical Disability
Law Rep. 185 (1996).
172 DeLuca, 77 F.3d at 592 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 592-93 (Kearse, J., dissenting) (stating that the trial judge's suggestion of
an exit route, in case of a not guilty verdict, was an insufficient reason to not present
affirmative defense).
174 Id. at 592. The defense attorney testified at the evidentiary hearing that he
could not investigate this defense without the defendant agreeing to see a psychiatrist.
Id. at 586.
175 491 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995).
176 Id. at 688.
177 Id. at 689.
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understand or appropriately explain the extreme emotional distur-
bance defense to his client.'78 When Patten was asked when he
decided not to pursue the defense, he admitted that he did not
believe he ever decided."7 With all of the evidence available to
Patten at the time of DeLuca's trial, especially his attempt to call a
rape trauma expert, it appears clear that Patten did not understand
the defense well enough to consider it a viable option to no de-
fense. Counsel's failure to consider this defense in light of the
prosecution's case was a breakdown in a process that should lead to
just results.18° It was not hindsight 1 ' to conclude that the failure
to understand the importance of this defense was equivalent to in-
adequate assistance. It was common sense.182 Even with strong
deference given to counsel's judgment, in light of the circum-
stances of the case,' 83 his abandonment of the extreme emotional
disturbance defense at an early stage of the trial.8 4 cannot be con-
sidered reasonable.
X. THE RIGHT TO TESTIFY
In Rock v. Arkansas,'85 the Supreme Court held that criminal
defendants have a right to testify on their own behalf. 86 The de-
fendant has the ultimate authority to make certain basic decisions
about her case, including whether or not she wishes to testify.'87
However, "little has been written by the Supreme Court or [the
Second] Circuit to explicitly flesh out the implications of Rock."' 88
The Second Circuit has questioned the proposition that a defend-
ant's failure to object, during a trial, to an attorney's refusal to al-
low her to testify, constitutes a waiver of the constitutional right of
the defendant to testify.
189
The question addressed in DeLuca's case was "what actions
178 DeLuca, 77 F.3d at 590-93.
179 Id. at 587.
180 DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F. Supp. 1330, 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 578 (2d
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 83 (1996).
181 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (warning against the dis-
torted effects of hindsight).
182 DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at 1347.
183 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.
184 DeLuca, 77 F.3d at 586.
185 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
186 Id. at 49. The Court noted that the most important witness in a criminal trial
may be the defendant. Id. at 52.
187 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
188 DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at 1353 (footnote omitted).
189 United States v. Vargas, 920 F.2d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1990).
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must be taken by courts and counsel to protect that right" 9 ° of the
defendant to testify. How does the defendant know that it is ulti-
mately her right to testify? Who has the burden of informing the
defendant of this right? The district court set out three methods
that have been determined to be viable in deciding whose responsi-
bility it is to ensure that the defendant knows that the decision to
exercise this right is hers alone. 91 The first method puts the bur-
den on the attorney,9 2 while the second method puts the burden
on the trial court to ensure that the defendant knowingly and will-
ingly waived her rights. 93 The third method puts the burden of
protecting the right to testify on the defendant.'94 However, as
Judge Ward explained, if the defendant is unaware that the right to
testify belongs to her, she cannot waive that right knowingly and
voluntarily. 95
The district court went to great lengths to determine if a sub-
sequent holding that an attorney must notify his client of a right to
testify should be retroactively applied to DeLuca.' 9 6 After declin-
ing to do so because it would be announcing "a new constitutional
rule of criminal procedure,"'97 the court established an excep-
tion19 giving defense counsel the responsibility of informing the
defendant that the right to testify was ultimately hers.'99
Evidence was presented that DeLuca wanted to and expected
to testify at her trial.2 0 0 The court held that Patten's failure to in-
form DeLuca that the right to decide whether or not to testify ulti-
mately belonged to her was also evidence of ineffective counsel z.2 0
Judge Ward's decision in this case became a point of disagreement
between courts in the Second Circuit and the New York state courts
which eventually led the United States Court of Appeals for the
190 DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at 1355.
191 Id. at 1355-56.
192 United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1533 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (hold-
ing that defense counsel has the responsibility of advising defendant of the right to
testify, but the defendant has the ultimate right to decide).
193 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
194 United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 1987).
195 DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at 1356.
196 Id. at 1357-59.
197 Id. at 1359. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) ("[A] case announces
a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defend-
ant's conviction became final." (citation omitted)).
198 Id. The exception is when a new rule implicates the fundamental fairness of a
criminal trial. Id. at 312; DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at 1359.
199 DeLuca, 858 F. Supp. at 1360.
200 Id. at 1361.
201 Id.
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Second Circuit to decide the issue of a criminal defense attorney's
responsibility regarding a defendant's right to testify. 22
XI. AF-TERIMATH
Within a few months after DeLuca, two districts courts faced
the same issue. Using the reasoning in DeLuca as part of the basis
for its decision, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York in Campos v. United States'°3 held that counsel
was ineffective because he never advised his client that it was the
client's decision whether or not to testify.20 4 In the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, the district court in Brown v. Artuz2°5 affirmed
Judge Ward's decision in DeLuca but distinguished the instant case.
It was found that the defendant's allegations could not be corrobo-
rated, as they had been in DeLuca.20 6 The court also found that
even if the defendant had evidence that he was denied the right to
testify, he failed to show that he was prejudiced by that denial.
20 7
In upholding the district court decision in Brown v. Artuz, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit finally addressed and an-
swered the question of what responsibilities the defense counsel
has to inform his client of her right to testify. 2 8 The court held
that this right is personal to the defendant and cannot be exercised
by the defense counsel. 2 9 The issue was not whether a defendant
knows she has the right to testify, but whether she knows that the
right is hers alone. 210 More importantly, the court held that coun-
sel must inform his client that the right to testify belongs entirely to
the client.21  Failure of counsel to do so would be evaluated under
the first prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test as set out
202 Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1077 (1998).
203 930 F. Supp. 787, 792-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
204 Id.
205 No. 95 Civ. 2740, 1996 WL 511558 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 124 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1077 (1998).
206 Id. at 6-8. See United States v. DeFeo, No. 90 Cr. 250, 1997 WL 3259 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
207 Id. at 7. Interestingly, after these cases were decided, Judge Tonetti, DeLuca's
trialjudge, disagreed with Judge Ward and held that defense counsel does not have to
inform defendant of his right to testify in specific terms. He reasoned that if the
defendant does not openly disagree with defense counsel, counsel's waiver is valid
and binding on defendant. See People v. Roman, 658 N.Y.S.2d 196, 199-200 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1997).
208 124 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1077 (1998).
209 Id. at 78.
210 Id. at 80.
211 Id. at 79.
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in Strickland.12
XII. CONCLUSION
The two part Strickland test places a heavy burden on the de-
fendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she has
received ineffective counsel which prejudiced the outcome of her
case. In DeLuca's case, the defendant's version of the events and
the trial proceedings were corroborated by her trial attorney, the
records of a forensic psychiatrist, and witnesses who were available
twelve years later.
When the Supreme Court enunciated the principles by which
lower courts should decide questions of ineffective counsel, Justice
O'Connor stated that it was most important that courts remember
that those principles were not mechanical rules.2 13 "[T] he ulti-
mate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding whose result is being challenged. '214 Reasonable peo-
ple can always adamantly disagree on principles. 215 The present
case is a prime example. The district court judge disagreed with
the magistrate, while the Second Circuit Court of Appeals holding
was a split decision. 2
16
As seen by the present case and its aftermath, the question of
what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel is not moot. The
question of who bears the responsibility for ensuring that a defend-
ant is informed of her right to testify is settled for the moment, at
least in the Second Circuit. Sheila DeLuca's case forced that issue.
To some, it may appear that Sheila DeLuca was given a second
trial, a second chance. After ten years in prison, she was fortunate
enough to be able to present the evidence of a case that told her
side of an unfortunate incident. Others may feel that the manner
in which DeLuca's original trial was handled was inexcusable. The
question that must be answered is whether any trial can be funda-
mentally fair when an accused does not have the opportunity to
defend herself.
212 Id.
213 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 701-18 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting); Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974
F.2d 302, 309 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Feinberg, J., dissenting); People v. Flores, 639
N.E.2d 19, 22-24 (N.Y. 1994) (Titone,J., dissenting); People v. Moye, 489 N.E.2d 736,
739-40 (N.Y. 1985) (mem.) (Jason, J., dissenting); People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d
898, 911-15 (N.Y. 1976), (Cooke, J., dissenting), affd, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); People v.
Walker, 473 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462-67 (1st Dep't 1984) (Sandler, J., dissenting).
216 Interestingly, both the magistrate judge and the dissenting judge were women.
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The need to show that counsel's performance prejudiced the
possible outcome of a trial was a heavy burden imposed by the
Strickland Court. The Court tried to ensure that counsel's errors
would not automatically open the floodgates to any prisoner who
felt that her attorney could have done a betterjob. However, when
one is sitting in prison sensing that she has been the victim of an
injustice, no burden is too heavy.
Sheila DeLuca's case has already had far reaching effects. It
clarified the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. More im-
portantly, DeLuca ensures that attorneys diligently consult with
their clients and thoroughly explain their rights to them.
This is what justice requires.2 y
217 DeLuca eventually pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to time
already served. When leaving court on the day of her sentencing she met a brother of
a man that Bissett had killed. He happened to be serving on a jury, saw her case
listed, and wanted to meet her. He explained to her that he had attempted to contact
her through the District Attorney's office when he heard of Bissett's death but had
been unable to do so. DeLuca said that meeting him was the best thing that hap-
pened to her since her arrest.
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